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Since 1989, global foreign exchange turnover (and settlements) has more than tripled,
to just over $2 trillion per day. This article expands upon a January 2005 Chicago Fed
Letter that described broad clearing and settlement principles, and focuses more specifically
on foreign exchange settlement practices, past and present.
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Once currencies were free
to seek their own economic
values, banks quickly realized
that FX trading rooms were
potential profit centers.
In the 1970s, foreign exchange (FX)
trading emerged as a significant line of
business for large, internationally active
financial institutions. Prior to the mid-
1970s, the true commercial need to
convert demand deposit account bal-
ances from one currency to another
was related to import/export transac-
tions that involved letters of credit, and
FX rates for any currency tended to be
fixed, pegged to another currency, or
otherwise contained within predefined
target ranges. During the 1970s, FX
rates began to float freely; once curren-
cies were free to seek their own econom-
ic values, banks quickly realized that FX
trading rooms were potential profit cen-
ters. More importantly, the methods by
which trading counterparties today de-
liver the currency sold, and receive the
contra-currency purchased, are far better
and safer than the methods under which
FX trades settled in the 1970s and 1980s.
The basics
In the 1970s, there were many more
European currencies than there are
today. Traveling from one European
country to another or conducting busi-
ness in a variety of European countries
required that one had sufficient quan-
tities of the proper currencies of all these
countries. Imagine traveling from Texas
to California, passing through New
Mexico and Arizona, with each requir-
ing its own “state” currency. Today, the
so-called eurozone (comprising 25 mem-
ber states of the European Union) has
a single currency, the euro, which is the
second most dominant (traded) currency
in the world behind the U.S. dollar.
An FX trade, by definition, involves
two currencies, the currency sold and
the currency purchased, for example,
selling U.S. dollars (USD)1 and buying
British pounds sterling (GBP). Foreign
exchange transactions always involve
both a trade date and a settlement date.
The latter is typically called a value date—
the forward banking day common to
both countries2 on which both parties
to the transaction will pay the curren-
cy amount they are obligated to pay
with the full expectation that they will
receive the currency amount that they
are entitled to receive.
Foreign exchange trades typically set-
tle according to standardized settlement
conventions, e.g., “for spot” or in two
business days; for 30, 60, or 90 calendar
days forward; and on the Wednesday
following the third Monday of March,
June, September, and December.3 Al-
though most FX is traded for spot, many
FX transactions are negotiated either
well before the planned settlement date
(usually to lock in the rate of exchange
in advance) or just before the date of
a well-anticipated commercial transac-
tion (if fixing the rate of exchange in
advance is not a priority).1.  CLS average daily values, March 2005
NOTES: The average daily value of South Korean won was 0.45 billion U.S. dollars; the currency's value is not repre-
sented due to scaling.
SOURCE: CLS Bank International.
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Finally, there is the issue of temporal risk.
Depending on the countries involved,
the actual payment of the currency sold
and receipt of the contra-currency re-
ceived will almost certainly occur at dif-
ferent times (but on the same day) and
could occur as much as 14 hours apart.
“Trust me” FX settlement
In the early 1970s, the trading of FX
was dominated by very large interna-
tional banks. Settlement payments were
made on trust that the contra-currency
would be remitted by the counterparty
on the proper value date. Banks were
accustomed to quantifying and limit-
ing risk exposures to each other, and
the trading and ultimate settlement of
FX transactions involved such exposures.
As there were then no techniques that
might have ameliorated the temporal
and principal risks associated with FX
settlements, those risks were recognized
for what they were and addressed by
the trading and settlement limits that
banks set for each other.4
This “trust me” system of settling FX
transactions worked fairly well until
June 26, 1974. On that Wednesday,
German banking authorities shut down
Bankhaus Herstatt at the close of the
German business day. It was not, however,
the close of the global financial day. In
New York, where the majority of the USD
sides of FX transactions settled through
the Clearing House Interbank Payments
System (CHIPS),5 it was only late morning
(six hours behind Germany). Foreign
exchange settlements involving German
deutsche marks (DEM) were allowed
to be processed (by the bank regulators)
through the end of the German bank-
ing day. At the close of the German
banking day, German banking author-
ities stopped all of Herstatt’s banking
activities. The Chase Manhattan Bank,
Herstatt’s USD correspondent bank,
stopped sending dollar payments on
behalf of Herstatt through CHIPS.
Other banks that had entered into FX
contracts to sell DEM (and any other
currency versus the dollar) and receive
USD suddenly realized that they had
already paid the DEM to Herstatt and
now stood to receive no USD in return.
The trust me system essentially came
apart at the seams. This is a real life exam-
ple of why 100% of the principal of an FX
transaction is at risk on the value date.
First improvements
In a crude way, the International Mon-
etary Market (IMM), a division of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, initially
began to protect itself from “Herstatt
risk” by requiring that buyers of matur-
ing foreign currency futures contracts
remit their USD to the exchange one
or two days before the settlement date.6
This early asymmetric approach at least
eliminated Herstatt risk for the buyers
of FX (sellers of USD). In March 1977,
the IMM implemented the first payment
versus payment methodology7 for deliv-
ering FX on maturing futures contracts.
Sellers of foreign currency were instruct-
ed to deliver their foreign currency into
the IMM’s indigenous foreign curren-
cy delivery accounts. Sellers making
good delivery were paid their USD from
Chicago; those that failed to make good
delivery were not. Dollars so withheld
constituted cash collateral that secured
any foreign currency overdrafts in non-
dollar accounts at the IMM’s bank.8 Prin-
cipal risk associated with the settlement
of FX was thus eliminated.9
In 1990, the Society for Worldwide In-
terbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT)10 inaugurated its FX trade con-
firmation comparison service, Accord.
This additional value-added service au-
tomated much of the back-office pro-
cessing of FX trades, provided running
settlement exposures to counterparties
by currency and value date, and option-
ally created the additional SWIFT mes-
sages to cause FX payments to be made
on the appropriate value date. SWIFT’s
Accord later became the “front end” to
the CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement)
Bank International (discussed later).
In March 1996, the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) published the Allsopp
Report,11 a sobering insight into the mag-
nitude of the daily settlements among
the 80 largest banks in the world and
the risk mitigation tools they were using.
In many cases, the risk of FX settlements
of a single large international bank to
a single counterparty often exceeded
the capital of the bank.
That October, the U.S. Federal Reserve
announced that its Fedwire funds trans-
fer service (Fedwire) would open at
12:30 a.m. eastern time, starting on
December 8, 1997. This meant that,
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At the annual SWIFT international bank-
ing operations seminar (Sibos), held in
Florence, Italy, in 1996, a consortium
of approximately 20 banks announced
that it would expend significant resources
to develop a simultaneous payment ver-
sus payment methodology to settle FX
transactions. This methodology would
become known as CLS, for Continuous
Linked Settlement.12 This consortium
of banks also announced that its mem-
bers expected to use SWIFT’s Accord
for CLS’s “front end.”13
21st century methodology
CLS Bank International commenced
operations of its CLS service on Sep-
tember 9, 2002. The CLS system makes
every payment individually by simulta-
neously transferring, across its own
books, the currency sold and the cur-
rency purchased. Because the system
queues transactions in the optimal or-
der to be processed (meaning the order
that minimizes the clearing participants’
actual funding requirements), the
amount of actual funding required of
CLS clearing participants is only about
2% of the gross amount of settlements.
Clearing participants are required to
remit currency payments to the CLS
accounts maintained at central banks
by a specific time.
The CLS process is designed to take
advantage of the overlapping hours of
the national payments systems of the
relevant currencies to fund the multi-
laterally netted settlement obligations
(pay-ins) necessary to extinguish the
Rather, CLS represents that if a party
delivers its FX properly, it will receive
the contra-currency (if the counter-
party delivers it properly) or the FX
payment will be returned (if the counter-
party fails to deliver its contra-currency).
Thus, the Herstatt risk has been elimi-
nated, although counterparty opera-
tional performance exposure remains.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of the
currencies that  settle through CLS. It
should be noted that the U.S. dollar
(USD) and the euro (EUR) dominate
the FX markets. The Japanese yen
(JPY), British pound sterling (GBP),
and the Swiss franc (CHF) are also
highly traded currencies.
Conclusion
In the 1970s, the trading of FX emerged
from a little known moneychanging
operation, usually associated with the
letter of credit departments of large
international banks, to a major line of
business for many of these banks. Tele-
communications have evolved from
300 baud Edward R. Murrow-esque
teletype machines to electronic trading
screens with near instantaneous response
times. SWIFT, itself created in the early
1970s, has emerged as the network of
choice for banks to exchange (transmit)
FX trade confirmations and to send pay-
ment instructions that ultimately settle
such trades (most likely through CLS).
The trust me method of settling FX
transactions with all of its inherent risks
is almost history.14 It is appropriate, given
the explosive growth in global capital
markets in general and foreign exchange
in particular, that today’s modern fi-
nancial system can settle every day (on
average) 170,000 transactions, the ap-
proximate equivalent of $2 trillion15 of
FX transactions, without principal risk.
Today, on average, slightly over $2 trillion of FX transactions
settle every business day without principal risk.
1 International currency codes are always
three characters—the first two describe
the country of origin (usually in the lan-
guage of that country) and the last char-
acter describes the name of the currency.
2 Foreign currency transactions can only
be entered to settle on business (banking)
dates common to both countries. While
European and North American banking
holidays often coincide, this is not the case
with holidays in the Middle East, Asia, and
Africa. The process of determining value
dates for FX transactions is precise.
3 These four dates are IMM (International
Monetary Market) dates—the settlement
dates for all FX futures contracts traded on
the International Monetary Market, a di-
vision of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
and on the FINEX (Financial Instrument
Exchange) division of the New York Board
of Trade. An inordinate amount of FX
transactions and financial derivatives
contracts (traded on and off organized
markets) also intentionally settle on these
four dates.  Futures-related FX deliveries
currently average approximately $50 billion;
OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives that
settle on these dates are many multiples
of that.
provisional credit extended by CLS Bank
International to its clearing participants.
Today, on average, slightly over $2 tril-
lion of FX transactions settle every busi-
ness day without principal risk. That is,
CLS does not guarantee that the counter-
party with which a party elects to do an
FX transaction will necessarily complete
it, or complete it with proper value.
major national payment systems would
have common operating hours. Other
central banks made minor adjustments
to their respective settlement deadlines,
removing virtually all remaining obstacles
for the emergence of a potential private
sector solution that could provide true
payment versus payment settlement of
the world’s FX transactions (without
principal risk).4 In addition, many banks’ support systems
at the time did not have the capacity to
recognize the risk offsetting characteris-
tics of unmatured purchases and sales of
the same currencies. Thus, the assumed
replacement value (5%–10%) of all open
FX contracts often more than covered the
true replacement exposures of an entire
portfolio of forward FX trades.
5 In 1974, CHIPS settled dollar transactions
in next day funds. Payments for value to-
day were multilaterally netted as though
they were made, and clearing participants
having an obligation to make payment did
so the following morning in same day funds
(hence, the term next day funds). This
convention continued until October 1,
1981, when CHIPS clearing participants
began to settle their respective net fund-
ing obligations at the end of the business
day in same day funds.
6 Buyers of European currencies were re-
quired to post 100% of the purchase
price on the third Monday of March,
June, September, and December. Buyers
of Canadian dollars and Mexican pesos
were required to post their payments in
full on Tuesdays. Buyers of foreign cur-
rency were paid interest on their deposits.
This limited the IMM clearinghouse’s risk
exposure to buyers of foreign currency.
7 Granted, the payment of USD occurred
on a different date than the payment of
the foreign currency.
8 Because buyers of foreign currency were
required to pay their dollars one or two
days in advance, buyers were known to be
“good.” Accordingly, the IMM paid FX to
the buyers in anticipation of receipt from
the sellers. Any shortfalls were collateral-
ized with the USD that were then not re-
mitted to sellers that failed to deliver FX
properly. Errant transactions, although
few, usually came in a day or two late; then
and only then did the sellers receive their
USD. In the early 1980s, The Options
Clearing Corporation implemented a near-
ly identical system to settle options on FX.
9 Today, currency futures contracts traded
on the IMM that are also eligible to settle
through CLS Bank International do so.
CLS Bank International is chartered as an
Edge Act corporation, or as a U.S. corpo-
ration that is allowed only to engage in
international banking or other financial
transactions related to international busi-
ness; it is supervised by the Federal Reserve.
CLS Bank International’s main operations
center is in London with backup facilities
in the U.S. It is a privately owned bank,
designed to transfer ownership of currency
pairs simultaneously.
10SWIFT was created in the early 1970s and
is owned by the largest banks in the world.
Its primary product is a highly secure “store
and forward” network that allows banks
and other financial services companies to
send standardized messages to effect pay-
ments and settle trades.
11Bank for International Settlements, Com-
mittee on Payment and Settlement Systems,
1996, “Settlement risk in foreign exchange
transactions,” report, Basel, Switzerland,
March.
12See Gabriele Galati, 2002, “Settlement
risk in foreign exchange markets and CLS
Bank,” BIS Quarterly Review, December,
pp. 55–65.
13Clearing and settlement systems have “front
ends” and “back ends.” A front end is made
up of the hardware, software, and commu-
nications links by which clearing organiza-
tions receive and compare trade data. A
clearing organization’s back end refers to the
transmission of settlement transactions to set-
tlement banks and/or securities depositories.
14Herstatt risk is still present in settlements of
currencies not currently supported by CLS.
15Peak daily settlement through CLS was
the equivalent to $3.684 trillion.